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Hooray! Fidesz and EPP will part ways from now on, and that is undoubtedly great
news. Of course, these glad tidings would have given me even more pleasure in
2020 or 2019 or, for that matter, 2011. Now, the EU budget has been passed and
the rule of law conditionality has been suspended in a manner most contrary to the
rule of law, and Viktor Orbán and his friends can line their pockets in peace. Angela
Merkel’s and Ursula von der Leyen’s CDU/CSU, on the other hand, are about to face
the electorate soon, at which moment they are overcome by the abrupt realisation
of what an unbridgeable gulf separates them from Fidesz, all things considered.
But that’s okay, better late than never, so let’s stop the whinge and let bygones be
bygones and look forward to the future.
And what do we see there?
I have talked to some friends from Hungary today. They see one date in particular,
and that is the Hungarian parliamentary elections in spring 2022, and the actual
possibility that Fidesz will lose them.
This is in fact a real possibility this time, not just, as usual, a theoretical one. The
opposition, so fragmented up to now, has formed an electoral alliance with a
common platform and common candidates, and it is anything but impossible that
it will thus be able to cross the majority line on election day. Fidesz has always
benefited from the fact that electoral law in Hungary disproportionately favours large
parties. Now it is no longer the only large party. Now it has competition.
As of now, Fidesz is not doing very well. The pandemic has hit the country hard, with
almost as many deaths relative to the population as in the US, and a mortality rate
of 3.5%, surpassed in the EU only by Bulgaria. The Fidesz government’s strategy
of going it alone with Chinese and Russian vaccines seems to be meeting with
resistance: Many distrust the Chinese vaccine, especially since it will not allow free
movement because the other EU states do not recognise it, not even Poland.
So who knows: perhaps in a little over a year there will be a new government. Of
course, it’s still a lot more likely that there won’t. Orbán’s campaign machinery is as
well-oiled as ever. The government, following the Polish example, is just warming up
to building up the LGBTQI community as its next bogeyman to scare conservatives
into submission after Soros and migrants have run their course in that role. And
thanks to the EU’s recovery billions he has enough money to make sure he is liked
wherever he isn’t. But still: a possibility, a real possibility! In a few months, the voters
in Hungary will decide in a primary election who will be the leading candidate. Spring
is approaching in the Carpathian Basin at last. Who would have thought!
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 Call for Applications
Democratic values and the rule of law are increasingly put under pressure in the
EU, and the ways and means of upholding them have become much-discussed
legal, political and social issues. In light of these challenges, re:constitution fosters
exchange and analysis on democracy and the rule of law in Europe.
The programme invites applications for 20 Fellowships for the upcoming
2021/2022 academic year. Please find the Call for Applications  here, the deadline
for applications is 6 April 2021.
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What if the possibility materialises? What if the united opposition is no longer the
opposition, but actually the government? It has promised not only a transitional
government for a democratic reset, but a real government for a whole legislative
period. The coalition includes the former neo-Nazis of the Jobbik party as well as
the heirs of the post-communist gangsters whose rule made the rise of Fidesz
possible in the first place. Even if they all manage to mobilise their voters where
their own candidates are not running – the question whether and how such a
disparate coalition can actually govern for four years is not entirely trivial to answer.
In neighbouring Slovakia, the four-party coalition that started out to clean up the
SMER mafia state is, after one year in office, pretty much in shambles by now.
Most of all, the coalition would come up against a state that Orbán, in ten years of
Fidesz rule, has systematically prepared for the eventuality of losing power, in order
to make it as unlikely as possible for the new government to govern successfully.
Essential parts of the legislation are laid down in so-called cardinal laws, which can
only be changed with a two-thirds majority. In all sorts of places, Orbán’s constitution
provides for offices that can also only be filled with a two-thirds majority, and on top
of that with extremely long terms of office, so that the new government would have to
work for years with people who will still receive their orders from Viktor Orbán.
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Double bind
How is the new government supposed to govern successfully if it doesn’t at least get
rid of Attorney General Péter Polt? As long as he is in office, the corruption networks
of the Fidesz party will have very little to fear indeed. Polt was confirmed for a new
term only in 2019, and that term is no less than 9 years. Of course, the government
could set up a parallel anti-corruption agency, as they have successfully done in
Romania. But there would still be the Constitutional Court to make sure that can’t
happen, also packed with loyal Orbán friends and collaborators. The coalition would
be surrounded by institutions that would give them hardly any room for manoeuvre:
the judiciary, the central bank, the state audit office (which watches over the party
finances, very practical!), plus the fabulous new “foundations” into whose hands
Fidesz has “privatised”, or wants to, the media and public universities.
Unless the opposition wins a landslide and captures a two-thirds majority (at least
a theoretical possibility in the Hungarian electoral system; Fidesz did after all), the
new government will have little choice if it wants to achieve anything in the four years
for which it was elected: it will have to bend, if not break, the rules. It will have to go
into conflict with the rule of law. Ignore constitutional court rulings. Fire incumbents
without legal basis. Things like that.
And in Brussels, they will have to decide whether to unleash the rule of law
mechanism – which will by then finally be implemented – on the new government.
Or whether they would prefer to look the other way. Either way, Orbán would have a
blast.
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Verleihung der Hermann-Mosler- und Gerhard-Kegel-Preise 2020/2021
Die Dissertationspreise für NachwuchswissenschaftlerInnen werden dieses Jahr an
Dr. Maria Monnheimer (Hermann-Mosler-Preis) und Dr. Adrian Hemler (Gerhard-
Kegel-Preis) verliehen.
Die Veranstaltung wird über den Völkerrechtsblog gestreamt. Der Link
sowie weiterführende Informationen sind auf http://www.dgfir.de zu
finden.
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Some believe that Fidesz is even hoping for such an electoral defeat. Then it would
be for the opposition to clean up the havoc wrought by the pandemic, strapped for
cash since the EU billions will be largely planned or spent by then, short of qualified
personnel, lacking resources. Look, they will say, this is what happens when you
elect those losers. They could silence all critics who keep carping about the state of
democracy in Hungary: Look, they could say, it’s perfect, peaceful change of power
is absolutely possible here, this is a squeaky-clean democracy as fine as you have
ever seen one! They could send the rule-of-law mechanism of the EU into a double-
bind maze from which it would not find its way out again so quickly. And ultimately,
after two, three, four years at the latest, they could triumphantly return to power, and
this time for good.
Nevertheless: removing Orbán from power, even if only for a few years, would still
be worth a lot. Among the things the new government could do, for example, is to
join the enhanced cooperation for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which
can take action against cases of fraud against the EU budget. Orbán was very much
against it, so far. I suppose he would be, wouldn’t he?
- 4 -
Many thanks to Viktor Kazai, Petra Bard, Csaba Györy and Márta Pardavi for
valuable input!
The week on Verfassungsblog
In the case of Xhoxhaj v Albania, the European Court of Human Rights has
dismissed the case of a former judge of the Albanian Constitutional Court against her
dismissal. As TILMANN HOPPE reports, the ECtHR has given clear priority to the
fight against corruption.
Georgia is sliding into authoritarianism and EU Council President Charles Michel
has gone there to mediate. As DAVIT ZEDELASHVILI notes, the EU seems to have
more influence on neighbouring countries than on its own member states.
This week, the ECJ handed down an important ruling on the subjugation of the
judiciary in Poland: it concerns the National Judicial Council, which selects
nominees for judgeships. The fact that there is no legal remedy against nominations
of judges to the Supreme Court is against EU law. I talk about this and the far-
reaching implications of this ruling in our crisis podcast with WOJCIECH SADURSKI.
5231 judges and public prosecutors have written an open letter to the EU
Commission asking it to finally become more active against the Polish
government’s judicial policies. JOHN MORIJN is furious about the response.
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Two cases concerning the Muslim headscarf are currently pending before the ECJ.
Advocate General Athanasios Rantos has delivered Opinions on these cases which,
in the opinion of MARTIJN VAN DEN BRINK, are seriously flawed.
In the UK, as reported last week, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in
the case of Shamima Begum, a young British woman who joined the IS in Syria at
the age of 15 and was subsequently stripped of her British citizenship. She wanted
to appeal against this, but cannot because she is not allowed to enter the United
Kingdom. The Supreme Court found this to be in order. DEVYANI PRABHAT puts
the ruling in context.
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In the dispute over prioritisation in Covid vaccination in Germany, LINO
MUNARETTO points to the imperative to effectively utilise vaccination capacity.
In Norway, the government had proposed to legislate a curfew during the pandemic.
This did not go down well at all with the public. On 17 February 2021, the proposal
was shelved in the face of strong opposition. KRISTIN BERGTORA SANDVIK,
HANS PETTER GRAVER and PETER SCHARFF SMITH report on what this case
says about the trust between the authorities and the public in Norway.
In the Netherlands, it has emerged on appeal that the Covid curfew imposed by the
government is legal after all. KYRA WIGARD and ARTHUR DYEVRE see the Dutch
judiciary growing in confidence to interfere in highly political matters.
In Denmark, the parliament has initiated impeachment proceedings against a former
minister for immigration. She had enforced a decree that all couples should be
separated unconditionally if one of the spouses was a minor. PERNILLE BOYE
KOCH shows the relevance of the case in the field of tension between Danish
migration policy and human rights obligations.
In Chile, a new constitutional assembly will be elected in April 2021 to replace
the current constitution, which dates back to the military dictatorship, with a new
one. The integration of social rights is a central demand of the Chilean population.
ERNESTO VARGAS WEIL explains what the Assembly can learn from German
constitutional history in this respect.
Is Palestine a state? In early February, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Court has issued a decision on this, which KAI AMBOS analyses in detail.
The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) was supposed to overhaul the 20-year-old e-
commerce directive, but in its first draft, the DSA reproduces many of the intricacies
of its predecessor. JOAN BARATA explains how this will affect the moderation of
online content by platforms.
In the German Bundestag, the Left Party recently proposed to improve the
readability of draft laws through synopses, which FELIX HERBERT thinks is a very
good idea.
Our big-time COVID-19 symposium this week has included reports from
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand and Ukraine. Next week, reports from Belgium, Estonia,
Iceland, Iran, Italy, Canada, Lebanon, Slovakia, South Africa and Hungary will follow.
That’s all for now. All the best to you, good health and may your Verfassungsblog
coffee mug always be well and fragrantly filled!
Thanks for reading, and see you next week,
Max Steinbeis
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